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REAL PROPBRTY-NOTICE-R.ECITALS IN UNRECORDED DEEDS IN CHAIN
OF TITLE-The plaintiff, Eiring, owner of all rights in a tract of land, attempted
to convey certain mineral rights to Earnest by deed. The alleged rights passed
from Earnest by subsequent mesne conveyances to McMillan, and, on the
death of McMillan, to the defendant as trustee. Eiring brought an action
against the defendant in statutory trespass to try title to the land. In the deed
from Eiring to Earnest blank spaces were left in the granting clause. Held, the
blank spaces rendered the deed void, and the deficiency was not cured by reference to another indefinite deed. After holding this, the court went on to
dispose of the other points in the defendant's case, as a matter of "academic
interest," and in a dictum said that "a grantee of land is chargeable with notice
of the facts appearing in all the deeds in his chain of title, whether recorded or
not."1 Republic National Bank of Dallas v. Eiring, (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) 240
S.W. (2d) 414.
The general proposition that a grantee of land is charged with notice of all
the recitals in the instruments on record which form his chain of title, and are

1

Principal case at 417.
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material thereto, is universally accepted by both the courts2 and text writers. 3
This proposition is often extended to charge the grantee with notice of all the
recitals in the unrecorded deeds making up his chain of title.4 It is submitted
that this extension places an undue hardship on the grantee in that it requires
that he take notice not only of the recitals in recorded deeds, to which he has
access by looking at the public record, but also to those in unrecorded deeds
which may be entirely out of his reach. 5 This rule had its roots in England, 6
where it was customary for the grantor to tum over all the title deeds in his
chain of title to the grantee at the time of the conveyance of title. 7 If for any
reason the grantor did not tum them over, the grantee was not bound to complete the purchase. 8 It is not difficult to understand that, under such circumstances, with the title deeds in his actual possession, the grantee was charged
with notice of what they contained, and in view of the English doctrine of
equitable mortgage, 9 if one of the deeds was missing, it would seem reasonable
to charge him with notice of an outstanding equitable interest. However, in this
country, the recording acts have supplanted the English custom of physically
transferring title deeds, and original title deeds are not necessary muniments of
title.10 If the deed containing the recital is not on record, there would appear
to be no reasonable way, if indeed any way at all exists, for the grantee to discover the nature of the recitals in it. Any finding of constructive notice of
such recitals ignores reality,U unless there are sufficient extrinsic facts to put
2 Sweet v. Henry, 175 N.Y. 268, 67 N.E. 574 (1903). "There is no principle of
law more elementary or better founded in reason than that all persons claiming an interest
in .•• real estate are bound to take notice of the recitations in a duly recorded instrument
in the chain of title of their grantor." Old Line Ins. Co. v. Stark, 126 Neb. 96 at 101, 252
N.W. 616 (1934). See also McKay v. Williams, 67 Mich. 547, 35 N.W. 159 (1887).
3 2 POMEROY, EQmTY JamsPRUDBNCE, 5th ed., §626 (1941); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 1293 (1939).
4 Runge v. Gilbough, 99 Tex. 539, 91 S.W. 566 (1906). It will be noted that the
court pointed out in that case that the plaintiffs were guilty of great negligence for failing
to "use the means which the law provides, to inform themselves of the state of title they
seek to acquire." See also Baker v. Mather, 25 Mich. 51 (1872); 2 POMEROY, EQUITY
JamsPRUDBNCE, 5th ed., §628 (1941) .
• 5 Care should be used to distinguish between cases in which the deed or instrument
recited is unrecorded [e.g., Texas Co. v. Aycock, 190 Tenn. 16, 227 S.W. (2d) 41 (1950)]
and those in which the instrument containing the recital is unrecorded [e.g., cases cited in
note 2 supra].
6 Bacon v. Bacon, Toth. 133, 21 Eng. Rep. 146 (1639); Moore v. Bennett, 2 Ch. Cas.
246, 22 Eng. Rep. 928 (1687).
7 55 AM. Jun., Vendor and Purchaser §178 (1946).
8 Barclay v. Raine, 1 Sim. & St. 449, 57 Eng. Rep. 179 (1823). In England, the
mere deposit of title deeds with another as security for a debt establishes an equitable mortgage on the land in favor of the one possessing the deed. Thus, if one of the deeds of the
grantor's chain of title is missing, it is notice to the grantee that there may be some outstanding equitable interest, and in such a case he cannot be a bona fide purchaser. Ex
parte Langston, 17 Ves. Jr. 115, 34 Eng. Rep. 88 (1810).
9 See note 8 concerning equitable mortgage.
10 55 AM. Jun., Vendor and Purchaser §178 (1946).
llJt is clear that the recording acts do not give the grantee constructive notice of the
recitals in an unrecorded deed, since those acts are designed merely to provide notice of what
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the grantee on inquiry, in which case he may properly be held to have notice
of whatever he could have discovered by reasonable inquiry.12 It is submitted
that the present rule, founded upon good reason in England, is without reason
in the United States. At least one court has rejected it, and instead adopted
what is submitted to be the more realistic approach to the problem, namely, no
constructive notice is given to the grantee when a deed containing the recitals
is not on record.13
James S. Taylor

appears in the record. In Ebling Brewing Co. v. Gennero, 189 App. Div. 782, 179 N.Y.S.
384 (1919), the court pointed out that since the English doctrine of equitable mortgage
does not prevail in the United States, the fact that a deed was missing from the record
would not warrant the assumption that there was an equitable charge outstanding, and
the grantee was held not to have constructive notice of the recitals in an unrecorded deed.
See also Old Line Ins. Co. v. Stark, supra note 2; Hubbard v. Knight, 52 Neb. 400, 72
N.W. 473 (1897); Smith v. Huntoon, 134 ill. 24, 24 N.E. 971 (1890). In these cases, the
deeds containing the recitals were all on record, and the courts emphasized that fact, giving
rise to the inference that perhaps they would not find constructive notice to the grantee if
they had not been on record.
12 As to what facts are sufficient in the ordinary case, see generally 55 AM.. Jun., Vendor
and Purchaser §§696-703 (1946).
13 Ebling Brewing Co. v. Gennero, supra note 11.

